Risk Graphprototype

Threat coverage matrix

Adversary-led view: attack vectors × the detections that watch them. An unwatched vector reads exactly like an unmapped requirement — 2 gaps right now.

Attack vectorKill-chain stageDetectionsCoverageLinked risksResidual at stake

Credential stuffing

Breach-corpus replay against login endpoints.

FKC-2FKC-3T1110.004

Credential access
CTL-031Adaptive MFA · TPR 95% · FPR 1% · MTTD 1mCTL-112Credential-stuffing WAF rules · TPR 88% · FPR 2% · MTTD 4mCTL-007Session anomaly detection · TPR 60% · FPR 5% · MTTD 12m
strongRSK-014$5.10M

AitM / session-token theft

Adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits (Evilginx-style) stealing live sessions.

FKC-3T1539T1557

Credential access
CTL-007Session anomaly detection · TPR 45% · FPR 6% · MTTD 38m
partialRSK-014$5.10M

SMS pumping / AIT

Artificially inflated traffic to premium-rate numbers.

FKC-5MA-01

Monetization— none —gapRSK-021$2.10M

Insider exfiltration

Bulk export of customer data by privileged users.

T1567

Exfiltration
CTL-054DLP export alerts · TPR 50% · FPR 8% · MTTD 4h
partialRSK-033$980k

Promo abuse

Synthetic accounts farming referral and promo credits.

FKC-4

Monetization— none —gapRSK-052$450k

Threat-framework library

Every technique in the shared libraries, checked against the register. Watched means a vector maps to it and has a detection; modeled means a vector exists but nothing watches it; unmodeled means nobody has decided whether it applies here.

Fraud kill chain

2/6 watched

FKC-1Synthetic identity creation · Account creationunmodeled
FKC-2Credential testing · Credential accesswatched
FKC-3Account takeover · Account takeoverwatched
FKC-4Promo and credit harvesting · Monetizationmodeled
FKC-5Traffic monetization · Monetizationmodeled
FKC-6Cash-out through resold balances · Cash-outunmodeled

MITRE ATT&CK

4/7 watched

T1110.004Brute force: credential stuffing · Credential Accesswatched
T1557Adversary-in-the-middle · Credential Accesswatched
T1539Steal web session cookie · Credential Accesswatched
T1078Valid accounts · Initial Accessunmodeled
T1566.002Phishing: spearphishing link · Initial Accessunmodeled
T1530Data from cloud storage · Collectionunmodeled
T1567Exfiltration over web service · Exfiltrationwatched

Messaging abuse

0/4 watched

MA-01Artificially inflated traffic (SMS pumping) · Toll fraudmodeled
MA-02Smishing from compromised accounts · Phishingunmodeled
MA-03Snowshoe sending across number pools · Filter evasionunmodeled
MA-04Brand-impersonating sender IDs · Impersonationunmodeled

How this feeds the graph

Detections are controls with sharper metrics — true-positive rate, false-positive rate, mean time to detect — so effectiveness is measured, not asserted. A red cell here raises the blindness factor on every linked risk, which pushes it up the dig-deeper queue on the dashboard.