Risk Graphprototype

Three audiences, one graph. Each pack is a view over the same objects, so the board, a regulator, and a customer can never be told different facts, only different levels of detail. The customer pack is checked on every build for dollar figures, internal codes, and staff names.

Issuance warning: 7 metric(s) in this pack have broken lineage (“ATO attempts / 10k logins” on RSK-014; “Successful ATO rate” on RSK-014; “MFA adoption” on RSK-014; “90-day churn of ATO'd accounts” on RSK-014; “Mean time to lockout” on RSK-014; “Privileged exports / week” on RSK-033; “DSAR responses on time” on RSK-041). It can only be issued with a written annotation.

Regulator pack · control environment statement

Compliance posture and evidence

For: Regulators and external auditors

Live draft · 2026-11-21

1. Scope

This statement covers 8 requirements across 2 frameworks, the controls mapped to them, and the policies those controls enforce. 7 of 8 requirements have a mapped control with test evidence from the last 180 days. Every requirement without that evidence is listed below rather than omitted.

2. Requirement coverage and test evidence

FrameworkRequirementControlsLast testedStatus
ISO 27001A.5.15 · Access controlCTL-0312026-10-03Evidenced
ISO 27001A.5.34 · Privacy and protection of PIICTL-0902026-09-13Evidenced
ISO 27001A.8.12 · Data leakage preventionCTL-0542026-10-05Evidenced
ISO 27001A.8.16 · Monitoring activities——No control
ISO 27001A.8.5 · Secure authenticationCTL-0312026-10-03Evidenced
SOC 2CC6.1 · Logical access securityCTL-0312026-10-03Evidenced
SOC 2CC7.2 · Monitoring for anomaliesCTL-0072026-10-24Evidenced
SOC 2CC9.2 · Vendor risk managementCTL-0772026-08-19Evidenced

A control untested for more than 180 days has its effectiveness halved in every residual risk score it supports.

3. Policy governance

PolicyVersionApprovedReview dueEnforced by
POL-01 · Access Control Policy3.22026-05-212027-05-21CTL-031, CTL-112
POL-02 · Security Monitoring & Detection Standard1.42025-10-062026-10-06 (overdue)CTL-007, CTL-054
POL-03 · Third-Party Risk Policy2.02026-01-142027-01-14CTL-077
POL-04 · Data Retention & Privacy Policy4.12026-07-052027-07-05CTL-090
POL-05 · Acceptable Messaging Use Policy1.02026-08-052027-08-05no control

4. Incidents on regulated risks

IncidentDateRiskCustomers affectedRoot causeStatus
INC-2026-063 · Contractor bulk export2026-10-14RSK-033under investigationunder investigationinvestigating
INC-2026-041 · ATO cluster via legacy login2026-07-18RSK-014118Credential stuffing through legacy login endpoint lacking MFA enforcementclosed
INC-2026-022 · Deletion requests missed in backup tier2026-06-03RSK-04140Retention pipeline skipped cold-storage backups when honoring deletion requestsclosed

5. Third-party oversight

VendorTierHolds PIILast reviewStatus
VND-01 · Primary cloud provider1yes2025-07-24review lapsed
VND-02 · SMS aggregator (route partner A)1no2026-06-17current
VND-03 · Identity verification provider2yes2026-09-08current
VND-04 · Offshore support BPO2yesneverreview lapsed

6. Remediation commitments

ActionRiskOwnerDueStatus
ACT-95 · Retire legacy login endpointRSK-014SecEng2026-11-23in progress
ACT-91 · Deploy AIT detection on messaging spendRSK-021R. Delgado2026-12-04open
ACT-88 · Passkey rollout for customer consoleRSK-014K. Osei2026-12-19in progress
ACT-97 · Automate quarterly privileged-access reviewRSK-033M. Chen2027-01-05open

7. Known gaps disclosed

  • Broken lineage: 8
  • Paper policy: 1
  • Vendor review lapsed: 2
  • Stale assessment: 1
  • Unmapped requirement: 1
  • Untested control: 1
  • Policy review overdue: 1

Gaps come from the same engine that drives the internal gap board, so this list cannot drift from what the risk team sees.

Issue this pack

Issuing freezes the pack exactly as rendered above. The snapshot is hash-chained to the one before it, and the database refuses any edit or delete, so what was sent stays provable after the underlying data moves on.